That can address things from Ukraine’s standpoint, but it doesn’t really resolve the broader political issue from the EU’s standpoint.
The fundamental problem is that there is a political dispute between Brussels and Orban related to political changes in Hungary. Brussels has decided to put pressure on Orban over it, to use as leverage against him, first with attempting to invoke Article 7 to strip Hungary’s voting rights in the EU, and then with withholding funds. Orban has decided to disrupt EU operations to use as leverage against Brussels.
Orban’s got a bunch of other things that he can block or disrupt. He could do the next EU FTA, say – there, it’s not practical for a subset of EU members to sign an agreement themselves, the way they could potentially do with Ukraine funds.
One way or another, they’re going to have to make a peace at some point.
Whether they’re more-efficient is going to be depend on the specific case in which they’re being used.
The actual quote in the article reflects that, is more qualified than the title:
“They work sometimes even more efficiently than artillery,” he told Newsweek. “So, FPV drones are indeed a tech revolution, even though the tech itself is quite easy. But it turned out to be very efficient.”
An artillery shell moves a lot faster than a drone does. If one needs to make something explode soon, then that time may make artillery preferable.
An artillery shell is going to be harder to shoot down than a drone is (and my guess is that this factor is only going to become more-prominent; it looks like counter-drone systems are getting attention, and the article mentions them).
An artillery shell is going to be generally less-affected by jamming than a drone is (though there are some guided artillery shells that make use of GPS or the like in Ukraine, like Excalibur).
As far as I know, there aren’t artillery shells that make use of two-way radio communication, whereas FPV drones do (or at least can). I’m not familiar with what the state-of-the-art is for identifying operator location from their radio broadcasts – and separating the operator from the transmitter could maybe help mitigate this – but I’d guess that there are probably efforts to identify an operator’s location.
On the other hand:
A drone can adjust its target in-flight to deal with movement of the target. Most existing artillery shells cannot do that (though some do to a limited extent; BONUS, one of the shells used by Ukraine, identifies and targets vehicles during the last part of its flight).
A drone doesn’t require the degree of (visible) infrastructure that artillery does.
Units launching drones can be more-dispersed than units firing artillery (each unit could just carry a single drone, which isn’t likely practical for a tube artillery unit).
A drone can be launched more-quietly.
A drone can fly at low altitude. Russia has counter-battery radar, as does Ukraine; a shell fired by artillery can be seen on such radars, and travels in a predictable, ballistic arc, exposing the location from which the shell was launched. While there are also ways to detect a drone, my guess is that in general, artillery firing at a target runs more risk of exposing its location than someone launching a drone.
A drone might have better range than artillery. Artillery shells need to have their kinetic energy imparted at the time they are fired (well, mostly, since there are things like base bleed shells or rocket-assisted shells). Air resistance grows as the square of velocity. Drones don’t have to fight that particular laws of physics, since they’re keeping a lot of their energy in the form of chemical energy for much of the flight. There are longer- and shorter- range drones in use in the conflict, and theoretically one can scale up artillery as well, but broadly-speaking, I’d say that drones have more potential for longer range than artillery.
I’d also add that, speaking from an American standpoint, my understanding from past reading is that the dual-purpose nature of small civilian/military drones has been something of a concern in the US. China dominates the small civilian drone market, and this is something that could have useful military applications. In a war, both expertise and production facilities for use at scale would be present in China. If mass drone production capacity is militarily-important, that’d be something to pay attention to.
And there are people who also argue the other way, that drones aren’t going to be that useful and receive undue emphasis. I’m not sure that I agree with that position, but I will agree to the extent that drones are not a mature technology and we don’t yet know how things will play out as drones and counter-drone systems (not to mention counter-counter-drone systems) evolve.
Hear me out please. If we're going for a dollar to dollar comparison, he might have a point... That's about the only way that makes any lick of sense though
Every country on the planet needs to adopt a policy of vocally and publicly calling his bluff at every turn. Make him lose face by overtly calling his bluff every time he opens his mouth about any little thing at all.
We should treat him as if his 50-year-old nukes are ancient, non-functional rust tubes overseen by black market scalpers and people who know better than to launch them. Because that’s exactly what they are.
His pronouncements included claims that American soldiers were committing suicide “by the hundreds” outside the city, and denial that there were any American tanks in Baghdad, when in fact they were only several hundred meters away from the press conference where he was speaking and the combat sounds of nearing American troops could already be heard in the background.
US intelligence analysts later concluded that Al-Sahhaf confidently made false statements because he genuinely believed in what he was saying. As the American forces approached Baghdad, the Iraqi army falsely reported that they had successfully counterattacked US forces, destroying numerous tanks and killing hundreds of American troops. Army Col. Steve Boltz, the deputy chief of intelligence for V Corps, expressed that they held the belief that Al-Sahhaf sincerely held the information he reported to be true. Boltz theorized that because Saddam’s regime was known for frequently punishing those who delivered bad news, military officers would fabricate reports about the battlefield situation. This systemic self-deception within the Iraqi hierarchy led to a surprising lack of awareness when the Americans entered the capital, with some captured Iraqi officers later bewilderingly admitting that they had no idea that the US forces had been so close.
newsweek.com
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